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Abstract
It has been realized that the measurement problem of quantum
mechanics is essentially the determinate-experience problem, and in
order to solve the problem, the physical state representing the mea-
surement result is required to be also the physical state on which the
mental state of an observer supervenes. This necessitates a systematic
analysis of the forms of psychophysical connection in the solutions to
the measurement problem. In this paper, I propose a new, mentalis-
tic formulation of the measurement problem which lays more stress on
psychophysical connection. By this new formulation, it can be seen
more clearly that the three main solutions to the measurement prob-
lem, namely Everett’s theory, Bohm’s theory and collapse theories,
correspond to three different forms of psychophysical connection. I
then analyze these forms of psychophysical connection. It is argued
that the forms of psychophysical connection required by Everett’s and
Bohm’s theories have potential problems, while an analysis of how the
mental state of an observer supervenes on her wave function may help
solve the structured tails problem of collapse theories.
1 Introduction
The measurement problem is a long-standing problem of quantum mechan-
ics. The theory assigns a wave function to an isolated physical system
and specifies that the evolution of the wave function is governed by the
Schro¨dinger equation. However, when assuming the wave function is a com-
plete description of the system, the linear dynamics is apparently incompat-
ible with the appearance of definite results of measurements on the system.
This leads to the measurement problem. Maudlin (1995a) gave a precise
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formulation of the problem in terms of the incompatibility. Correspond-
ingly, the three approaches to avoiding the incompatibility lead to the three
main solutions to the measurement problem: Everett’s theory, Bohm’s the-
ory and collapse theories. It is widely thought that these theories can indeed
solve the measurement problem, although each of them still has some other
problems.
On the other hand, it has been realized that the measurement problem of
quantum mechanics is essentially the determinate-experience problem (Bar-
rett, 1999). In the final analysis, the problem is to explain how the linear
dynamics can be compatible with the existence of definite experiences of
conscious observers. This requires that in the above solutions to the mea-
surement problem the physical state representing the measurement result
should be also the physical state on which the mental state of an observer
supervenes.1 As a result, different solutions to the measurement problem
may correspond to different forms of psychophysical connection. However,
this aspect of the measurement problem is ignored in Maudlin’s (1995a) for-
mulation. Moreover, although there have been some interesting analyses of
psychophysical connections in the three main solutions to the measurement
problem (Albert, 1992; Brown, 1996; Butterfield, 1998; Barrett, 1999; Brown
and Wallace, 2005; Lewis, 2007a), these analyses seems still not complete.
In this paper, I will propose a new, mentalistic formulation of the measure-
ment problem which gives prominence to the psychophysical connection, and
present a new analysis of the forms of psychophysical connection required
by the three main solutions to the measurement problem. In particular, I
will analyze whether each form of psychophysical connection satisfies the
principle of psychophysical supervenience and how the mental state of an
observer supervenes on her wave function.
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, I first introduce Maudlin’s
conventional formulation of the measurement problem, and then suggest a
new, mentalistic formulation of the problem which lays more stress on the
aspect of psychophysical connection. It is pointed out that the three main
solutions to the measurement problem, namely Everett’s theory, Bohm’s
theory and collapse theories, correspond to three different forms of psy-
chophysical connection. In Section 3, Everett’s theory is analyzed. The
theory requires that the mental state of an observer is not always deter-
mined by her whole wave function, and especially, for a post-measurement
1In this paper, supervenience will be always used in its standard definition. A set of
properties A supervenes on another set B in case no two things can differ with respect to
A-properties without also differing with respect to their B-properties (see McLaughlin and
Bennett, 2014). By this definition, the principle of psychophysical supervenience requires
that the mental properties of a system cannot change without the change of its physical
properties. In this paper I will not consider the possibility that there is no physical
state representing the measurement result on which the mental state of an observer may
supervene.
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wave function there are many mental states, each of which supervenes on
a certain branch of the wave function. It is argued that this form of psy-
chophysical connection seems to violate psychophysical supervenience. In
Section 4, Bohm’s theory is analyzed. It is argued that the two suggested
forms of psychophysical connection of the theory both have potential prob-
lems. In particular, the well-accepted form of psychophysical connection
(i.e. the form that the mental state of an observer supervenes on the con-
figuration of her Bohmian particles) may lead to the problem of allowing
superluminal signaling. In Section 5, I analyze collapse theories, in particu-
lar, how the mental state of an observer supervenes on her wave function in
these theories. It is argued that the analysis may help solve the structured
tails problem of collapse theories. Conclusions are given in the last section.
2 A mentalistic formulation of the measurement
problem
According to Maudlin’s (1995a) formulation, the measurement problem orig-
inates from the incompatibility of the following three claims:
(C1). the wave function of a physical system is a complete description
of the system;
(C2). the wave function always evolves in accord with a linear dynamical
equation, e.g. the Schro¨dinger equation;
(C3). each measurement has a definite result (which is one of the possible
measurement results whose probability distribution satisfies the Born rule).
The proof of the inconsistency of these three claims is familiar. Suppose
a measuring device M measures the x-spin of a spin one-half system S that
is in a superposition of two different x-spins 1/
√
2(|up〉
S
+ |down〉
S
). If (C2)
is correct, then the state of the composite system after the measurement
must evolve into the superposition of M recording x-spin up and S being
x-spin up and M recording x-spin down and S being x-spin down:
1/
√
2(|up〉
S
|up〉
M
+ |down〉
S
|down〉
M
). (1)
The question is what kind of state of the measuring device this represents.
If (C1) is also correct, then this superposition must specify every physical
fact about the measuring device. But by symmetry of the two terms in
the superposition, this superposed state cannot describe a measuring device
recording either x-spin up or x-spin down. Thus if (C1) and (C2) are correct,
(C3) must be wrong.
It can be seen that there are in general three approaches to solving the
measurement problem thus formulated. The first approach is to deny the
claim (C1), and add some additional variables and corresponding dynamics
to explain the appearance of definite measurement results. A well-known ex-
ample is Bohm’s theory (Bohm, 1952). The second approach is to deny the
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claim (C2), and revise the Schro¨dinger equation by adding some nonlinear
and stochastic evolution terms to explain the appearance of definite mea-
surement results. Such theories are called collapse theories (Ghirardi, 2011).
The third approach is to deny the claim (C3), and assume the existence of
many equally real worlds to accommodate all possible results of measure-
ments (Everett, 1957; DeWitt and Graham, 1973). In this way, it may also
explain the appearance of definite measurement results in each world in-
cluding our own world. This approach is called Everett’s interpretation of
quantum mechanics or Everett’s theory.
It has been realized that the measurement problem in fact has two levels:
the physical level and the mental level, and it is essentially the determinate-
experience problem (Barrett, 1999). The problem is not only to explain
how the linear dynamics can be compatible with the appearance of definite
measurement results obtained by physical devices, but also, and more im-
portantly, to explain how the linear dynamics can be compatible with the
existence of definite experiences of conscious observers. However, the mental
aspect of the measurement problem is ignored in Maudlin’s (1995a) formu-
lation, which defines the problem at the physical level.2 Here I will suggest
a new, mentalistic formulation of the measurement problem which defines
the problem at the mental level and lays more stress on the psychophysical
connection. In the formulation, the measurement problem originates from
the incompatibility of the following three assumptions:
(A1). the mental state of an observer supervenes on her wave function;
(A2). the wave function always evolves in accord with a linear dynamical
equation, e.g. the Schro¨dinger equation;
(A3). a measurement does not branch an observer into multiple ob-
servers.
The proof of the inconsistency of these assumptions is similar to the
above proof. Suppose an observer M measures the x-spin of a spin one-half
system S that is in a superposition of two different x-spins, 1/
√
2(|up〉
S
+
|down〉
S
). If (A2) is correct, then the physical state of the composite system
after the measurement will evolve into the superposition of M recording x-
spin up and S being x-spin up and M recording x-spin down and S being
2It seems that Maudlin’s ignorance is deliberate and he also has a defense for it
(Maudlin, 2007). According to Maudlin (2007), we had better avoid explaining how
determinate conscious experiences supervene on the wave function, since this brings in
the mind-body problem, the problem of explaining how consciousness could supervene on
anything physical in the first place, a problem which many take to be unsolvable. My
response is that if there is no any psychophysical connection, the measurement problem,
which is essentially the determinate-experience problem, cannot even be formulated at the
physical level as Maudlin (1995a) did. In other words, Maudlin’s (1995a) formulation of
the measurement problem implicitly assumes a certain form of psychophysical connection
(see later discussion).
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x-spin down:
1/
√
2(|up〉
S
|up〉
M
+ |down〉
S
|down〉
M
). (2)
If (A1) and (A3) are also correct, then there will be only one observer M
throughout the measurement, and the mental state of the observer M will
supervene on this superposed wave function. Since the mental states cor-
responding to the physical states |up〉
M
and |down〉
M
differ in their mental
content, the observer M being in the superposition (2) will have a conscious
experience different from the experience of M being in each branch of the su-
perposition by the symmetry of the two branches. In other words, the record
that M is consciously aware of is neither x-spin up nor x-spin down when she
is physically in the superposition (2). This is inconsistent with experimental
observations. Therefore, (A1), (A2) and (A3) are incompatible.
Since the measurement problem is essentially the determinate-experience
problem, this new mentalistic formulation of the measurement problem is
more appropriate than Maudlin’s original physicalistic formulation of the
problem. As noted before, the measurement problem cannot be formulated
if not assuming a psychophysical connection. What we are sure of is that
we as observers obtain a definite result and have a definite mental state af-
ter a measurement. But we are not sure of what physical state this mental
state corresponds to. For example, if the mental state supervenes randomly
on one branch of the post-measurement superposition such as (1), as in
the single-mind theory (Albert and Loewer, 1988), then the three claims in
Maudlin’s formulation are not incompatible. One may further argue that
Maudlin’s formulation also needs to rely on the assumption (A1) in the new
formulation if it is a valid formulation of the measurement problem. More-
over, if the assumption (A1) is included, the claim (C1) will be redundant.
Then, Maudlin’s formulation will reduce to the new formulation.
By this new formulation of the measurement problem, we can look at
the three main solutions of the problem from a new angle. The solution
to the measurement problem must deny either the assumption (A1) or the
assumption (A2) or the assumption (A3). Denying the assumption (A1)
means that the mental state of an observer supervenes not on her wave
function but on other additional variables. This corresponds to Bohm’s
theory. Denying the assumption (A2) is the same as denying the claim
(C2), which means that the Schro¨dinger equation must be revised. This
corresponds to collapse theories. In this case, the mental state of an observer
supervenes on her wave function. Similarly, denying the assumption (A3)
is the same as denying the claim (C3), which means that a measurement
branches an observer into multiple observers. This corresponds to Everett’s
theory. It is worth noting that since in this case a post-measurement wave
function corresponds to many observers, the mental state of each observer
is not uniquely determined by her whole wave function, and it supervenes
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on one branch of the wave function.
To sum up, the three main solutions to the measurement problem, namely
Everett’s theory, Bohm’s theory and collapse theories, correspond to three
different forms of psychophysical connection. In fact, there are only three
types of physical states on which the mental state of an observer may su-
pervene, which are (1) the wave function, (2) certain branches of the wave
function, and (3) other additional variables. The question is: Exactly what
physical state does the mental state of an observer supervene on? It can be
expected that an analysis of this question may help solve the measurement
problem.
3 Everett’s theory
I will first analyze Everett’s theory. The theory assumes that the wave
function of a physical system is a complete description of the system, and
the wave function always evolves in accord with the Schro¨dinger equation.
In order to solve the measurement problem, the theory claims that for the
above post-measurement state (2) there are two observers, and each of them
is consciously aware of a definite record, either x-spin up or x-spin down.3
There are (at least) three ways of understanding the notion of multi-
plicity in Everett’s theory: (1) measurements lead to multiple worlds at
the fundamental level (DeWitt and Graham, 1973), (2) measurements lead
to multiple worlds only at the non-fundamental “emergent” level (Wallace,
2012), and (3) measurements only lead to multiple minds (Zeh, 1981; Albert
and Loewer, 1988). In either case, for the above post-measurement state (2),
the mental state of each observer is not uniquely determined by her whole
wave function, and it supervenes on one branch of the wave function. In the
following, I will argue that this form of psychophysical connection seems to
violate the principle of psychophysical supervenience (see Gao, 2017 for a
more detailed analysis).
Consider a unitary time evolution operator, which changes the first
branch of the superposition (2) to its second branch and the second branch
to the first branch. It is similar to the NOT gate for a single q-bit, and is
permitted by the Schro¨dinger equation in principle. Then after the evolu-
tion the superposition does not change. According to Everett’s theory, the
wave function of a physical system is a complete description of the system.
Therefore, the physical properties or physical state of the composite system
does not change after the unitary time evolution.
On the other hand, after the evolution the mental state of each ob-
server which supervenes on the corresponding branch of the superposition
3Note that in Wallace’s (2012) latest formulation of Everett’s theory the number of
the emergent observers after the measurement is not definite due to the imperfectness of
decoherence. My following analysis also applies to this case.
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will change; the mental state supervening on the first branch will change
from being aware of x-spin up to being aware of x-spin down, and the men-
tal state supervening on the second branch will change from being aware of
x-spin down to being aware of x-spin up.4 Then, the mental state of each
observer does not supervene on the whole superposition or the physical state
of the composite system. Since the mental states of the system are composed
of the mental states of the two observers, they do not supervene on the phys-
ical state of the system either. Therefore, it seems that the psychophysical
supervenience is violated by Everett’s theory in this example. Note again
that supervenience is used here in its standard definition, and the princi-
ple of psychophysical supervenience requires that the mental properties of a
system cannot change without the change of its physical properties.
It is worth noting that the validity of this argument is independent of
the ways of understanding multiplicity in Everett’s theory. It is well known
that the many-minds theory violates psychophysical supervenience (Albert
and Loewer, 1988; Barrett, 1999), and thus the above result is not new
for the theory. But for the many-worlds theory, no matter the worlds are
at the fundamental level or only at the non-fundamental “emergent” level,
the above result is new; it seems that a many-worlds theory also violates
psychophysical supervenience.
There are two possible ways to avoid the violation of psychophysical su-
pervenience in the above example. The first way is to deny that after the
evolution the physical state of the composite system has not changed. This
requires that the wave function of a system is not a complete description of
the physical state of the system. Obviously, this requirement is not consis-
tent with Everett’s theory. The second way is to deny that after the evo-
lution the total mental states or mental properties of the composite system
have changed. For example, one may argue that after the above evolution
there remain a mental state corresponding to seeing a spin up result and a
mental state corresponding to seeing a spin down result, and thus the to-
tal mental states of the composite system have not changed. However, this
seems to require that each observer has no trans-temporal identity, while
the absence of identities of observers is inconsistent with the predictions of
quantum mechanics and experience. If each observer has a trans-temporal
identity and her mental state supervenes on the corresponding branch of
the superposition, then her mental state will change after the evolution, and
thus the total mental states or mental properties of the composite system,
which are composed of the mental states of these observers, also change after
the evolution.5
4If this is not the case, then for other evolution or other post-measurement states such
as those containing only one branch of the superposition, the predictions of the theory
may be inconsistent with the predictions of quantum mechanics and experience.
5By comparison, if for the post-measurement superposition (2) there is only one ob-
server whose mental content is composed of seeing a spin up result and seeing a spin down
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It is usually thought that if a mental state supervenes on part of a
physical state then the mental state also supervenes on the physical state.
This is indeed the case in the classical domain. But it may be not the
case in the quantum domain, e.g. when the physical state is completely
described by the wave function. The reason is that when one branch of
a wave funcion is changed, if only the other branch is also changed in a
particular way, the whole wave function may be unchanged. Then when
a mental state supervenes on one branch of the wave function, it may not
supervene on the whole wave function; when the branch of the wave function
and the corresponding mental state change, the whole wave function may
not change.
Finally, I note that if the above analysis is valid, then the measurement
problem can be formulated as the incompatibility of only two assumptions:
(A1). the mental state of an observer supervenes on her wave function; and
(A2). the wave function always evolves in accord with a linear dynamical
equation, e.g. the Schro¨dinger equation. The reason is that if a measurement
branches an observer into multiple observers as in Everett’s theory, then the
mental state of an observer will not supervene on her wave function, and
thus the third assumption in the previous mentalistic formulation of the
measurement problem can be dropped.
4 Bohm’s theory
Let us turn to Bohm’s theory. In this theory, there are two suggested forms of
psychophysical connection. The first one is that the mental state supervenes
on the branch of the wave function occupied by Bohmian particles, and the
second one is that the mental state supervenes on the (relative) configuration
of Bohmian particles.
The first form of psychophysical connection has been the standard view
until recently, according to which the mental state of an observer being
in a post-measurement superposition like (2) supervenes on the branch of
the superposition occupied by her Bohmian particles. Indeed, Bohm ini-
tially assumed this form of psychophysical connection. He said: “the packet
entered by the apparatus [hidden] variable... determines the actual result
of the measurement, which the observer will obtain when she looks at the
apparatus.” (Bohm, 1952, p.182). In this case, the role of the Bohmian par-
ticles is merely to select the branch from amongst the other non-overlapping
branches of the superposition.
The first form of psychophysical connection is also called Bohm’s re-
sult assumption (Brown and Wallace, 2005), and it has been widely argued
result, then her mental state will not change after the above evolution, and the princi-
ple of psychophysical supervenience can be satisfied (see further discussion about collapse
theories in Section 5).
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to be problematic (Stone, 1994; Brown, 1996; Zeh, 1999; Brown and Wal-
lace, 2005; Lewis, 2007a). For example, according to Brown and Wallace
(2005), in the general case each of the non-overlapping branches in the post-
measurement superposition has the same credentials for representing a defi-
nite measurement result as the single branch does in the predictable case (i.e.
the case in which the measured system is in an eigenstate of the measured
observable). The fact that only one of them carries the Bohmian parti-
cles does nothing to remove these credentials from the others, and adding
the particles to the picture does not interfere destructively with the empty
branches either.
In my view, the main problem with the first form of psychophysical con-
nection is that the empty branches and the occupied branch have the same
qualification to be supervened by the mental state. Moreover, although it is
imaginable that the Bohmian particles may have influences on the occupied
branch, e.g. disabling it from being supervened by the mental state, it is
hardly conceivable that the Bohmian particles have influences on all other
empty branches, e.g. disabling them from being supervened by the mental
state.
In view of the first form of psychophysical connection being problematic,
most Bohmians today seem to support the second form of psychophysical
connection (Lewis, 2007a), although they sometimes do not state it explic-
itly (Maudlin, 1995b). If assuming this form of psychophysical connection,
namely assuming the mental state supervenes on the (relative) configuration
of Bohmian particles, then the above problems can be avoided. However,
it has been argued that this form of psychophysical connection is inconsis-
tent with the popular functionalist approach to consciousness (Brown and
Wallace, 2005; see also Bedard, 1999). The argument can be summarized
as follows. If the functionalist assumption is correct, for consciousness to
supervene on the Bohmian particles but not the wave function, the Bohmian
particles must have some functional property that the wave function do not
share. But the functional behaviour of the Bohmian particles is arguably
identical to that of the branch of the wave function in which they reside.
Here one may respond, as Lewis (2007b) did, that all theories must
give up some intuitive familiar theses and functionalism is the one that
Bohm’s theory must give up. However, it has been argued that the second
form of psychophysical connection also leads to another serious problem of
allowing superluminal signaling (Brown and Wallace, 2005; Lewis, 2007a).
If the mental state supervenes on the positions of Bohmian particles, then
an observer can in principle know the configuration of the Bohmian particles
in her brain with a greater level of accuracy than that defined by the wave
function. This will allow superluminal signaling and lead to a violation of
the no-signaling theorem (Valentini, 1992).
The above analysis of psychophysical supervenience also raises a general
doubt about the whole strategy of Bohm’s theory to solve the measurement
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problem. Why add hidden variables such as positions of Bohmian particles
to quantum mechanics? It has been thought that adding these variables
which have definite values all the time is enough to ensure the definiteness of
measurement results and further solve the measurement problem. However,
if the mental state cannot supervene on these additional variables (e.g. due
to certain restrictions such as the no-signaling theorem), then even though
these variables have definite values at all time, they are unable to account for
our definite experience and thus do not help solve the measurement problem
(see also Barrett, 2005).
5 Collapse theories
I have argued that one will meet some difficulties if assuming the mental
state of an observer supervenes either on certain branches of her wave func-
tion or on other additional variables. This seems to suggest that Everett’s
and Bohm’s theories are not promising solutions to the measurement prob-
lem. Moreover, this also suggests that the mental state of an observer may
supervene directly on her wave function, and collapse theories may be in the
right direction to solve the measurement problem.6
However, collapse theories are still plagued by a few problems such as
the tails problem (Albert and Loewer, 1996). In particular, it seems that the
structured tails problem has not been solved in a satisfactory way (see Mc-
Queen, 2015 and references therein). The problem is essentially that collapse
theories such as the GRW theory predicts that the post-measurement state
is still a superposition of different outcome branches with similar structure
(although the modulus squared of the coefficient of one branch is close to
one), and they need to explain why high modulus-squared values are macro-
existence determiners. In my view, the key to solving the structured tails
problem is not to analyze the connection between high modulus-squared val-
ues and macro-existence, but to analyze the connection between these values
and our experience of macro-existence, which requires us to further analyze
how the mental state of an observer supervenes on her wave function.7
Admittedly this is an unsolved, difficult issue. I will give a brief analysis
here (see Gao, 2016 for a more detailed analysis). Consider an observer M
being in the following superposition:
α |1〉
P
|1〉
M
+ β |2〉
P
|2〉
M
, (3)
where |1〉
P
and |2〉
P
are the states of a pointer being centered in positions x1
and x2, respectively, |1〉M and |2〉M are the physical states of the observer
M who observes the pointer being in positions x1 and x2, respectively, and α
6I will consider only objective versions of collapse theories here.
7Note that this issue is independent of whether the observer can correctly report her
mental content, which is related to the bare theory (Albert, 1992; Barrett, 1999).
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and β, which are not zero, satisfy the normalization condition |α|2+|β|2 = 1.
The question is: What does M observe when she is physically in the above
superposition?
First of all, it can be seen that the mental content of the observer M
is related to the modulus squared of the amplitude of each branch of the
superposition she is physically in. When |α|2=1 and |β|2=0, M will observe
the pointer being only in position x1. When |α|2=0 and |β|2=1, M will
observe the pointer being only in position x2. When α = β = 1/
√
2, by
the symmetry of the two branches the mental content of M will be neither
the content of observing the pointer being in position x1 nor the content of
observing the pointer being in position x2.
Next, it can be argued that the mental content of the observer M is also
related to the phase of each branch of the superposition she is physically in.
Assume this is not the case. Then when α = −β = 1/√2 and when α = β =
1/
√
2, the mental content of M will be the same, which is neither the content
of observing the pointer being in position x1 nor the content of observing
the pointer being in position x2. Then, when M is in a superposition of these
two physical states, her mental content is still the same. However, since the
superposition of these two states is |1〉
P
|1〉
M
, the observer M being in this
superposition will observe the pointer being in position x1. This leads to
a contradiction. Note that the mental content of M is related only to the
relative phase of the two branches of the superposition she is physically in,
since an overall phase has no physical meaning, and two physical states with
only a difference of overall phase are in fact the same physical state.
Now I will analyze how the mental content of the observer M is deter-
mined by the amplitude and phase of each branch of the superposition she is
physically in. This is a difficult task. And I can only give a few speculations
here. Let us first see a few special cases. When |α|2=0 or |β|2 = 0, the
mental content of the observer M does not contain the content of observing
the pointer being in position x1 or x2. Similarly, the mental content of the
observer M does not contain the content of observing the pointer being in
another position x3 which is different from x1 and x2, since the amplitude of
the corresponding term |3〉
P
|3〉
M
is exactly zero. On the other hand, when
|α|2 = 1 or |β|2 = 1, the mental content of the observer M is the content of
observing the pointer being in position x1 or x2. Then when |α|2 6= 0 and
|β|2 6= 0, the mental content of the observer M can only contain the content
of observing the pointer being in position x1 and the content of observing
the pointer being in position x2. Moreover, according to the above analysis,
how these two contents constitute the whole mental content of the observer
M is determined by the values of α and β.
It seems relatively easy to conjecture how the modulus squared of the
amplitude determines the mental content of the observer M. Again, let us
see a few special cases. When |α|2 = 0, the mental content of the observer
M does not contain the content of observing the pointer being in position
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x1. When |α|2 = 1, the mental content of the observer M contains only
the content of observing the pointer being in position x1. Similarly, when
|β|2 = 0, the mental content of the observer M does not contain the content
of observing the pointer being in position x2. When |β|2 = 1, the mental
content of the observer M contains only the content of observing the pointer
being in position x2. Then it seems reasonable to assume that the mental
property determined by the modulus squared of the amplitude is a certain
property of vividness of conscious experience. For example, when |α|2 is
close to one the conscious experience of M observing the pointer being in
position x1 is the most vivid, while when |α|2 is close to zero, the conscious
experience of M observing the pointer being in position x1 is the least vivid.
In particular, when |α|2 = |β|2 = 1/2, the conscious experience of M ob-
serving the pointer being in position x1 and the conscious experience of M
observing the pointer being in position x2 have the same intermediate vivid-
ness. However, it seems more difficult to conjecture the nature of the mental
property determined by the relative phase. It is probably a new property
which we don’t know and have not experienced either.
To sum up, I have argued that the mental content of an observer is re-
lated to both the amplitude and relative phase of each branch of the super-
position she is physically in, and it may be composed of the mental content
corresponding to every branch of the superposition. Moreover, the modulus
squared of the amplitude of each branch may determine the vividness of the
mental content corresponding to the branch.
It can be seen that the above analysis of how the mental state of an ob-
server supervenes on her wave function may help solve the structured tails
problem of collapse theories. In particular, if assuming the modulus squared
of the amplitude of each branch indeed determines the vividness of the men-
tal content corresponding to the branch, then the structured tails problem
may be solved. Under this assumption, when the modulus squared of the
amplitude of a branch is close to zero, the mental content corresponding to
the branch will be the least vivid. It is conceivable that below a certain
threshold of vividness an ordinary observer or even an ideal observer will
not be consciously aware of the corresponding mental content. Then even
though in collapse theories the post-measurement state of an observer is still
a superposition of different outcome branches with similar structure, the ob-
server can only be consciously aware of the mental content corresponding to
the branch with very high amplitude, and the branches with very low am-
plitudes will have no corresponding mental content appearing in the whole
mental content of the observer. This will solve the structured tails problem
of collapse theories.
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6 Conclusions
It has been realized that the measurement problem is essentially the determinate-
experience problem. The problem is not only to explain how the linear
dynamics can be compatible with the appearance of definite measurement
results obtained by physical devices, but also, and more importantly, to
explain how the linear dynamics can be compatible with the existence of
definite experiences of conscious observers. This suggests that in order to
formulate and solve the measurement problem we need to analyze how the
mental state of an observer relates to her physical state. However, the men-
tal aspect of the measurement problem has been ignored in the conventional
formulation of the problem, and the analysis of the forms of psychophysical
connection in the solutions to the measurement problem seems not system-
atic and complete either in the literature.
In this paper, I propose a new, mentalistic formulation of the measure-
ment problem which lays more stress on the psychophysical connection. It
is pointed out that the three main solutions to the measurement problem,
namely Everett’s theory, Bohm’s theory and collapse theories, correspond to
three different forms of psychophysical connection. Moreover, I argue that
the forms of psychophysical connection required by Everett’s and Bohm’s
theories have potential problems, while an analysis of how the mental state
of an observer supervenes on her wave function may help solve the struc-
tured tails problem of collapse theories. This seems to suggest that collapse
theories may be in the right direction to solve the measurement problem.
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